The composition of government spending and the multiplier at the Zero Lower Bound by Albertini, Julien et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
 F
 B
  
  
  
X
X
X
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 E
 C
 O
 N
 O
 M
 I
 C
  
  
 R
 I
 S
 K
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
B
 E
 R
 L
 I
 N
 
 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2014-017 
 
The composition of 
government spending 
and the multiplier at 
the Zero Lower Bound 
 
Julien Albertini* 
Arthur Poirier** 
Jordan Roulleau-Pasdeloup***    
            
* Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany 
** University of Evry-Val-d’Essonne, France 
*** CREST, PSE, France 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
ISSN 1860-5664 
 
SFB 649, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
S
F
B
  
  
  
6
 4
 9
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
E
 C
 O
 N
 O
 M
 I
 C
  
  
 R
 I
 S
 K
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 B
 E
 R
 L
 I
 N
 
 
The composition of government spending
and the multiplier at the Zero Lower Bound
Julien Albertini∗
INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC THEORY II
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Spandauerstraße 1
10178 Berlin
Arthur Poirier†
EPEE, TEPP
University of Evry-Val-d’Essonne
Bd, François Mitterand
91025 Evry Cedex
Jordan Roulleau-Pasdeloup‡
CREST, PSE
15 Boulevard Gabriel Peri
92245 Malakoff Cedex
February 15, 2014
Abstract
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1 Introduction
The size of the multiplier has received a renewed interest since the American
Investment and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) stimulus has been enacted in 2009.
Influential papers in the recent New Keynesian literature have shown that the
government spending multiplier is larger at the zero lower bound (ZLB for
short) on the nominal interest rate than in normal times (Eggertsson (2011),
Christiano et al. (2011) and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012)). The reason
is that when the nominal interest rate is pinned at zero, the monetary policy
does not absorb the propagation of the government spending shock which bet-
ter translates into output. However, these studies have paid little attention to
the way government spending is modeled while the composition of the fiscal
package may crucially impact the size of the multiplier. The ability of govern-
ment spending to serve as input to private production or to be substitutable
for private consumption (Barro (1990)) may have important consequences.
In a simple New Keynesian model, we investigate alternative specifications
for the composition of government spending. We show that the multiplier at
the ZLB is 1) lower when the government spending is productive; 2) lower
when consumption and government purchases are substitutable and 3) nega-
tive if the composition of the fiscal package rules out the non substitutability
of government spending for private consumption. With our preferred ARRA
specification the multiplier is barely higher than outside the ZLB and lower
than 1.
2 The model
We build a standard New Keynesian DSGE model with Rotemberg sticky prices,
monopolistic competition and a Taylor rule on the nominal interest rate. Gov-
ernment spending can be either productive (Gpt ) or utility-enhancing. The sec-
ond case can be divided into perfectly substitutable (Gst ) and non-substitutable
(Gnt ) for private consumption.
2.1 The representative household
Households intertemporal utility is defined by:
max
ct,dt,nt
E0
∞
∑
t=0
(
t
∏
k=0
βk
)[
(ct + Gst )
1−σ
1− σ − `
nt1+φ
1 + φ
+
(Gnt )
1−σ
1− σ
]
(1)
where ct is aggregate consumption and nt is the level of employment supplied
by households. σ and φ denote the risk aversion coefficient and the inverse of
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the Frisch elasticity respectively. βt represents a discount factor shock that we
interpret as a preference shock. The representative household takes as given
{pt, wt, it}∞t=0 and the initial wealth (d0) in order to maximize equation (1) sub-
ject to the budget constraint:
ptct + dt = dt−1(1 + it−1) + wtnt +Πt − Tt (2)
where Πt is firms’ profits, dt bonds, pt the aggregate price and Tt is a lump-
sum tax. Optimality conditions are given by the following equations (with
pit = pt/pt−1 and wRt = wt/pt):
λt = (ct + Gst )
−σ (3)
λt = (1 + it)Etβt+1
λt+1
pit+1
(4)
wRt = `n
φ
t (ct + G
s
t )
σ (5)
2.2 Firms
The final good producer operates in a perfectly competitive market. He pro-
duces a good yt using intermediate goods yjt. The demand for the intermediate
good j writes:
yjt =
(
pjt
pt
)−e
yt (6)
where e is the elasticity of substitution between goods. The nominal price
index is defined by pt =
[∫ 1
0 p
1−e
jt dj
] 1
1−e .
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers indexed
by j using two inputs to produce and sell output yjt to final good producers.
The first one is labor njt (such that nt =
∫ 1
0 njtdj). As in Linnemann & Schabert
(2006), Bouakez & Guillard (2013) and Roulleau-Pasdeloup (2013), the second
one is productive government spending Gpt :
yjt = (G
p
t )
1−αnαjt (7)
with 1− α being the elasticity of output to productive government spending.
We thus make the standard assumption of constant returns to scale. Firm j
maximizes its intertemporal profit (8) taking {pt, wt}∞t=0 as given, subject to (6)
and (7):
max
pjt,njt
E0
∞
∑
t=0
(
t
∏
k=0
βk
)
λt
λ0
 pjt
pt
yjt − wtpt njt − yt
ψ
2
(
pjt
pipjt−1
− 1
)2 (8)
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The price adjustment cost—governed by ψ—is proportional to output and pi
is the steady state gross inflation rate. Dropping subscript j by symmetry, the
optimality conditions are:
mct = wRt
nt
αyt
(9)
0 = (1− e) + emct − ψpit
pi
(pit
pi
− 1
)
+ Etβt+1
λt+1
λt
ψ
pit+1
pi
(pit+1
pi
− 1
) yt+1
yt
(10)
where mct is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (7). Equation (10) is the
forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve.
2.3 Monetary and fiscal authorities
We assume that the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate following a
Taylor rule1 (bounded by the ZLB) in response to deviations of inflation and
output from their steady-state values:
1 + it =
{
pi
β
(pit
pi
)ρpi ( yt
y
)ρy
if it > 0
1 otherwise
(11)
Total government expenditures Gt are shared as follows: Gst = τGt, G
p
t = γGt
and Gnt = (1− τ − γ)Gt, with 0 ≤ τ + γ ≤ 1. Finally, Gt = g¯ exp(gt) where gt
follows an AR(1) process and g¯ is the amount of government spending at the
steady state.
2.4 Market clearing
The aggregation of individual profits Πt is given by: Πt = ptyt − ntwt −
ptytΓpit . Together with the budget constraint (2) and the government budget
constraint, this gives the aggregate resource constraint :
yt
[
1− ψ
2
(pit
pi
− 1
)2]
= ct + Gt (12)
1As in Christiano et al. (2011), the interest rate has no persistence.
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3 Model solution and baseline calibration
We follow Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012) to calibrate the model based on
quarterly frequencies2.
Table 1: PARAMETERS
Variables Symbol Value Source
Discount factor β 0.994 Standard
Risk aversion coefficient σ 1 Standard
Elast. of subst. between goods e 6 Standard
Frisch elasticity φ 1 Standard
Annual steady state inflation pi 0.02 Data
Production function elasticity α 0.92 Roulleau-Pasdeloup (2013)
Autocorrelation coefficient ρβ 0.8 Christiano et al. (2011)
Std. of β shock σβ 0.002 target 5% at the ZLB
Price adjustment ψ 40 Standarda
Response to inflation ρpi 1.5 Standard
Response to output ρy 0.25 Standard
Government spending g¯ 0.1815 Target 0.2y
Autocorr. coefficient gt ρg 0.7 Target ARRA
Std. of gt shock σg 0.1825 Target ARRA
aIn the log-linearized Phillips curve, ∂pit∂mˆct = (e − 1)/ψ. Structural estimates of New
Keynesian models find values around 0.5 for this coefficient (see Krause & Lubik (2007)
and the references therein), implying ψ ' 10. On the other hand, a Calvo parameter of 0.75
implies ψ ' 90. We choose an intermediate value of 40 to match the response of inflation
(and thus the one of private consumption) usually obtained in the literature.
4 Results
We study five specifications: (i) Gt = Gnt ; (ii) Gt = G
p
t ; (iii) Gt = G
s
t and (iv)
two specifications that attempt to represent the legislated part of the ARRA
fiscal package. Cogan et al. (2010) have studied the impact of the ARRA but
they do not provide a detailed decomposition of different types of government
2We solve the model using the Parameterized expectation algorithm (PEA) projection
method. This latter solves non-linear stochastic dynamic problems using polynomials (we
rely on Chebyshev ones here) to approximate conditional expectations. The probability of
entering and leaving the ZLB are endogenously determined and are considered in agents’
expectations. Contrary to backward-induction methods (perfect foresight and the extended
path method), agents internalize future shock uncertainty since they are evaluated in the ex-
pectations. Further details are provided in the online appendix : https://sites.google.
com/site/ecojulien/working-paper.
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spending. We therefore rely on the following table, based on BEA data, to
calibrate the different shares of government spending:
2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2010Q1 2010Q2 2010Q3 2010Q4 2009 2010 2009-10
Total Stimulus 0 89 118 135 142 132 116 94 341 484 825
Government Spending 0 39 58 79 96 105 98 76 175 375 550
Income Support 0 10 15 19 19 16 13 10 44 58 102
Unemployment Insurance Benefits 0 4 6 8 8 7 6 4 18 25 43
Food Stamps 0 2 3 4 4 3 2 2 9 11 20
COBRA Healthcare 0 4 6 7 7 6 5 4 17 22 39
Infrastructure Spending 0 1 6 16 29 41 41 27 22 136 159
Traditional Infrastructure 0 0 2 9 16 24 24 14 11 78 89
Non-Traditional Infrastructure 0 1 4 7 13 17 17 13 12 58 70
Aid to State Government 0 24 28 32 35 35 31 29 84 128 211
Medicinal Match 0 10 12 13 13 13 13 13 35 52 87
Fiscal Relief 0 10 10 12 14 14 10 9 32 47 79
Local School District 0 3 5 6 7 7 7 6 14 27 41
Law Enforcement 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4
Healthcare/Education /Other 0 5 9 13 14 14 14 11 26 53 79
Tax Cuts 0 50 60 56 46 27 18 18 166 109 275
Business Tax Benefits 0 10 20 40 30 10 0 0 70 40 110
Individual Tax Benefits 0 40 40 16 16 17 18 18 96 69 165
Table 2: COMPOSITION OF THE ARRA. Source: BEA, BLS and Moody’s Econ-
omy.com. In Billion dollars
When computing total government spending over 2009-2010 we do not
consider income support and tax cuts since those two components are neu-
tral in a representative agent framework with lump-sum taxes. Identifying
productive government spending with infrastructure spending, we get γ =
0.35. The categorization of the remaining expenses is more debatable. In our
preferred ARRA specification, we take the Health/Education component as
perfectly substitutable government spending. This is only an approximation
since, for example, public and private education differ in terms of quality. With
this in mind, we find τ = 0.18 for the share of substitutable government spend-
ing in the stimulus plan. The remaining share is non-substitutable government
spending, 1− τ − γ = 0.47. However, to get a range for the multiplier un-
der the ARRA specification, it is useful to consider two polar cases in which
non-productive government spending is either non-substitutable (ARRA1) or
substitutable with private consumption (ARRA2).
Finally, we choose the standard deviation and autoregressive parameters
to match the size of the fiscal package as a share of GDP for 2009-2010, which
is equal to 1.58%. This gives σb = 0.1825. We choose ρg = 0.7 so that stimulus
spending essentially vanishes after 8 quarters3. To investigate the ZLB we use
a discount factor shock βt that sends the economy in a liquidity trap 8 quarters.
The multiplier at the ZLB is calculated as the response of output following a
shock on βt and gt in deviation from the response of output to a shock on βt
3Using the AR(1) process for government spending, we get that log(gt+8) = ρ8g ·
log(σgeg) ' 0.05 · log(σgeg).
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only4 and divided by the initial increase of Gt. The results are shown in Figure
1:
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Benchmark (τ=0, γ=0)
Productive only (τ=0, γ=1)
Substitutable only (τ=1, γ=0)
ARRA (τ=0.18, γ=0.35)
ARRA 2 (τ=0.65, γ=0.35)
Figure 1: Government spending multiplier.
In the benchmark model, the multiplier reaches 0.56 outside the ZLB and
1.5 at the ZLB. These values are broadly consistent with the related literature
in which the multiplier at the ZLB is higher than one and about three times
higher than in normal times. In normal times, the nominal interest rate adjusts
upward against the output and inflationary pressures caused by the increase
in government purchases. Consequently, the increase in the real interest rate
dampens the output effects of government expenses. When the nominal inter-
est rate is pinned at zero, higher government spending results in a lower real
rate and thus a multiplier that exceeds unity.
One can see that the composition of the fiscal package greatly influences
its efficacy. One earlier reference to the composition of the fiscal package is
Eggertsson (2011). He notes that for government spending to be effective at
increasing demand at the ZLB, it has to be directed at goods that are imper-
fect substitutes with private consumption (such as infrastructure or military
spending). In fact, as the dotted line shows, the impact of perfectly substi-
tutable government spending is nil. The reason is that private consumption
exactly offsets any effect stemming from this kind of government spending.
However, Eggertsson (2011) treats infrastructure spending as imperfectly sub-
stitutable. Being productive, infrastructure spending should appear in the ag-
gregate production function, implying a negative effect on the real marginal
cost and thus on prices. This deflation generates higher real interest rates
which reduce private consumption now. Indeed, Figure 1 shows that intro-
4See the online appendix and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012). The implied ZLB duration
following the shock on βt and gt is 7 quarters. With a shock on βt only the ZLB spell is 8
quarters in the baseline.
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ducing productive government spending in the fiscal package can reduce the
size of the output multiplier in a liquidity trap (see Bouakez & Guillard (2013),
Roulleau-Pasdeloup (2013)). Let us begin with the second polar case, ARRA2.
In this case, productive government spending generates a deflation that trig-
gers a negative multiplier at the ZLB. To paraphrase Eggertsson (2011), a pol-
icy that increases the natural rate of output can decrease actual output in the
short-run. But those effects on natural output grow as γ increases. To see this,
consider the case of only productive government spending (circled line). In
the short run, government spending has aggregate demand (through the prod-
uct market equilibrium) as well as aggregate supply (through the production
function) effects. But increasing productive government spending raises the
natural level of private consumption tomorrow, which prompts households
to consume more today, generating inflation today. As γ grows larger then,
increasing productive government spending is effectively an aggregate de-
mand policy. This is why the all-productive and first polar/ARRA1 cases yield
very similar results (which we do not report for the ARRA1 to save space on
the graph): beyond γ = 0.35, productive and non-substitutable government
spending have similar effects. For our preferred ARRA specification (squared
line), the aggregate demand effects of non-substitutable government spend-
ing are dampened by the aggregate supply effects of productive government
spending and the nil effect coming from substitutable government spending.
This results in a multiplier that hovers around 0.7, only slightly higher from its
value in normal times.
Since the Taylor rule is active outside the ZLB, aggregate supply effects
tend to dampen the increase in real rates and thus limit the crowding out of
private consumption. Coupled with a higher level of natural consumption
tomorrow, productive government spending induces higher multipliers than
in the standard case.
As this discussion has made clear, results depend crucially on how (dis)-
inflationary the fiscal stimulus is. In fact, most of the literature on the ZLB has
emphasized the role of real interest rates. While our benchmark calibration is
in line with some of the empirical evidence, higher values for ψ = 40 cannot
be ruled out (see e.g. the discussion in Erceg & Lindé (2010) and the references
therein). Since ψ indexes price rigidity, a higher value for this parameter will
imply a lower ∂pit∂mct . With inflation reacting less on impact, we expect that the
gap between multipliers for different composition of the fiscal package will
shrink. In Figure 2, we report the results of our preferred ARRA specification
and the standard multiplier for both ψ = 40 and ψ = 90. The case ψ = 90 cor-
responds to an average duration of prices of 4 quarters 5or a Calvo probability
of 0.75, as in Taylor (1999).
5The result are similar when considering a Calvo parameter of 0.9, which implies an aver-
age duration of prices of 10 quarters and a price rigidity parameter ψ = 650.
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Figure 2: Government spending multiplier.
In line with the intuition, the composition of government spending induces
a lower gap between the multipliers. This shows in the case where the econ-
omy is outside the ZLB. At the ZLB however, some differences remain. In the
standard case, higher price rigidity induces lower inflation on impact and thus
a lower multiplier. In the ARRA specification, higher price rigidity induces less
deflation so that the multiplier actually increases.
In summary, for the stimulative effects of government spending to be max-
imal at the ZLB, government spending should be both non-substitutable with
private consumption and wasteful. This was surely not the case with the Amer-
ican Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which included productive and
substitutable government spending as well. Our simulations indicate that its
effects were not likely to be much larger than in normal times, with output
increasing less than government spending.
5 Conclusion
We show that the multiplier at the ZLB may substantially vary, depending
on whether the government spending is productive, substitutable or not with
consumption. It lies between -0.25 and +1.5 according to the different specifi-
cations. It highlights that the modeling of government spending has important
implications for the policy analysis. The assumptions made about the structure
of government spending should be carefully considered. The estimation of a
more micro-founded DSGE model should be conducted for future research to
determine the right structure of government spending.
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